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ABSTRACT-This essay explains why school consolidation issues are especially difficult in rural America. Consolidation 
is most appropriate when adjacent districts have similar preferences for taxation and spending on schools. In that case, econo-
mies of scale can be reaped without interfering much with resident preferences on taxes and school quality. In urban areas 
residents signal these preferences by moving into (or out of) school districts that match their preferences, a process known 
as Tiebout sorting. As a result, school consolidation decisions can be based on good information about resident preferences. 
The basic claim of this essay is that Tiebout sorting works much less well in rural areas for a variety of reasons. This means 
that consolidation decisions are based on thinner information; consequently, school consolidation is more contentious and 
political in rural America. 
The essay then argues that, given this situation, a legislature interested in exploring rural school consolidation would 
do well to consider using legal and political processes that would enhance the ability of residents to express and record their 
preferences. Newer forms of political engagement that call on modem technology are available to do this and they may be 
effective in this context given the size and level of interest ofthe groups involved. 
Key Words: rural schools, consolidation, Tiebout model, taxes, school quality, preferences 
INTRODUCTION 
School consolidations are efforts to find the "right" size 
for a school district. These are always difficult decisions. 
S~hools are one of the most important goods provided by 
local government because they are highly visible, quite 
expensive, and greatly valued. And the size decision has 
the potential to affect virtually every aspect of a school 
and, in so doing, affect the kind of education children 
receive and the cost of providing it. But the decision ex-
tends far beyond the walls of the schoolhouse. In addition 
to defining who can attend schools and who must pay for 
them, a school district's boundaries also define, and in-
deed create, a community. 
This essay explains why school consolidation issues 
are especially difficult in rural America. Consolidation 
is most appropriate when adjacent districts have similar 
preferences for taxation and spending on schools. In that 
case, economies of scale can be reaped without interfer-
ing much with resident preferences on taxes and school 
quality. In urban areas residents signal these preferences 
by moving into (or out of) school districts that match their 
ManUSCript received for review, April 2013; 
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preferences, a process known as Tiebout sorting. As a re-
sult, school consolidation decisions can be based on good 
information about resident preferences. The basic claim 
of this essay is that Tiebout sorting works much less well 
in rural areas for a variety of reasons. This means that 
consolidation decisions are based on thinner information; 
consequently, school consolidation is more contentious 
and political in rural America.l 
Drawing on this framework, the essay then explores 
ways in which the process of making rural school consoli-
dation decisions could be improved. The general idea is 
that structures that provide incentives for residents to re-
veal their preferences are better than top-down directives. 
School consolidation decisions in rural America will al-
ways be contentious and political, but there are legal and 
political structures than might make them less so. 
This essay begins with a description of the basic 
Tiebout model and how it operates to expose resident pref-
erences about taxes and school quality. A consideration of 
how the model applies to school consolidation decisions 
follows. The first-order prediction of the model is that 
consolidation is more likely to occur as districts become 
more similar to each other. At the extreme, consolidation 
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would permit districts with exactly the same preferences 
to reap economies of scale without interfering at all with 
those preferences. In rural areas, however, the Tiebout 
model is less likely to provide reliable information about 
resident preferences; rural residents move less often and, 
even when they do move, they are less likely to rely heav-
ily on school quality in making their decisions. Finally, 
given the limits of Tiebout in the country, the essay pro-
ceeds to discuss ways in which rural school consolidation 
efforts could be structured to make up for this limitation. 
The primary suggestion is that legislatures interested in 
rural school consolidation should establish mechanisms 
to encourage or require better information disclosure, 
perhaps by calling on new forms of political engagement 
that use modern technology. 
SCHOOLS AND THE TIEBOUT MODEL 
In the early 1950s Charles Tiebout was a student in a 
graduate seminar on public finance offered by Richard 
Musgrave at Michigan. Musgrave, already one of the 
lions in the field, described for the class one of public 
finance's central problems: determining preferences for 
public goods. The general idea was that residents could 
not be excluded from enjoying the public goods offered 
by a locality, which meant that discovering preferences 
through pricing was unavailable and that residents had in-
centives to be strategically evasive if asked directly about 
their preferences. Based on this, Musgrave's position in 
the seminar (and in his publications) was that politics was 
the only mechanism available for determining the ap-
propriate level of public goods (Musgrave 1939). As the 
story goes, Tiebout responded by proposing a nonpoliti-
cal alternative in an offhand, maybe even joking manner. 
His suggestion was that preferences would be revealed 
if localities offered different packages of public goods 
and residents revealed their preferences by moving to the 
locality that best met their preferences (Fischel 2006, 2). 
Some years later Tiebout presented the idea formally in 
his short, canonical piece, A Pure Theory of Local Expen-
ditures (Tiebout 1956). 
What I will call the Tiebout model-residents voting 
with their feet for their preferred package of local public 
goods-has been a dominant lens through which to view 
issues relating to urban and suburban schools.2 And it 
has been an extremely powerful and useful lens. But the 
central thesis of this essay is that the lens is not very good 
for evaluating rural school consolidation. Instead we are 
closer to the original Musgrave hypothesis: that prefer-
ence revelation is a serious problem and politics, for better 
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or worse, is the primary solution. Despite this it is possible 
to address the preference revelation problem by structur-
ing the politics of rural school consolidation in certain 
ways. This essay will argue that rural school consolida-
tion, while always controversial, could be somewhat more 
efficient and less stressful if more attention were paid to 
political structure. 
First, let us consider the Tiebout model in its normal 
application as a way to discover resident preferences for 
school quality. The Tiebout story is that people have a 
choice of several localities in which to live, and an impor-
tant consideration in making that choice is how good the 
schools are perceived to be. It is not uncommon for people 
seeking housing to try to identify good schools first and 
then to search for houses in that area. Information about 
schools is one set of data regularly provided by realtors 
(Waldeck and Glynn 2013). Moreover, when people are 
deciding where to live, if the schools in District A are 
better than the schools in bordering District B, then they 
will be willing to pay more for houses in District A. This 
will capitalize the extra value of the better schools into 
the price of houses in District A and the lesser value of 
the schools in District B into the value of those houses. It 
is not uncommon for similar houses sitting on boundaries 
such as those between District A and B to have 10% to 
20% differences in price (Fischel 2009, 3). Tiebout sort-
ing, then, is a mechanism by which people reveal their 
preferences for school quality. By moving into District A 
and paying the higher price, they are indicating that they 
are willing and able to pay the necessary premium for that 
better schooP 
This, then, is the Tiebout model as normally applied. 
Communities offer a certain quality of school an? people 
who value schools will sort into those communities. In 
urban America the basic assumptions of the model are 
true enough: urban areas provide a variety of communi-
ties from which to choose; all are within a reasonable 
commuting distance; home buyers tend to be aware of dif-
ferences between schools in various districts; the popula-
tion is relatively mobile; zoning provides a mechanism 
for communities to limit free riders; and so on (Fischel 
2001, 58-71). The literature supporting the model is vo-
luminous and highly sophisticated. This is not the place 
to provide a full-blown review (for a good recent review, 
see Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). Suffice it to say here 
that the Tiebout model is not perfect (What model is?), but 
it does a pretty good job of describing reality-or, as one 
clever commentator put it, the model does a good job of 
describing both realty and one of its oldest sayings about 
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what is important: location, location, location (Fischel 
200l, 71). Maybe the saying should have been "Location, 
location, schools." 
The Tiebout model is primarily about decisions to live 
in one district or another, and the consequences of those 
decisions for housing prices and school quality. One of 
Tiebout's original (but implicit) assumptions was that 
district boundaries were set endogenously, which would 
then permit people to choose between districts based on 
the packages of public goods and taxes offered.4 But this 
is an essay about school district consolidation; it is about 
how the boundary lines are set and reset, not about how 
people decide to move across them after they are set. Less 
work has been done on this issue and, as far as I know, 
no work has been done considering rural school districts 
specifically (Brasington 2003a, 2003b; Saiger 2010). 
TIEBOUT AND SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION 
Let us begin with a simple model of school consolidation. 
There are two neighboring school districts. Each provides 
a certain level of schools at a particular price to their re-
spective populations. The two districts can remain sepa-
rate or consolidate to form a single district. Consolidation 
requires a positive vote from both districts.5 
The Tiebout model helps us to think about what kinds 
of factors might predict consolidation. The first-order 
prediction is that consolidation is more likely as the two 
di.stricts become more similar. In the extreme, if the two 
districts were identical in their size, school quality, taxes, 
and so on (which would imply identical preferences by the 
populations), then economies of scale would favor consoli-
dation.6 This implies that current trends toward more uni-
formity across a variety of dimensions (such as curriculum 
requirements and funding formulas) point toward more 
consolidations (Common Core n.d.; Nebraska Department 
of Education 2013; National Access Network 2013). 
Another way in which districts may become more simi-
lar would be through changing demographics. The Tiebout 
model recognizes that each district will comprise people 
with differing preferences. This means that some subset of 
residents will always be dissatisfied. Indeed, the main mov-
ing part in the model-its main insight-is that dissatisfied 
residents will move from their district to another that bet-
ter meets their preferences. This is the way in which resi-
dents reveal their preferences for a community's proffered 
package of school quality and taxes. But as those residents 
move the median voter in the district may shift up or down.7 
Obviously this could mean that the district moves further 
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away from neighboring districts in its preferred package 
of schools and taxes, but it could mean that it becomes 
closer to a neighboring district. Again, if it becomes close 
enough, economies of scale would support consolidation. 
Tiebout recognized that moving between districts was 
costly and that this would affect the extent to which his 
model would reveal preferences (Tiebout 1956, 422). At 
the extreme, if it was always too expensive for residents 
to move from one district to another, then no preferences 
for schools and taxes would be revealed under the model. 
Tiebout cautioned against blowing this out of propor-
tion because, as he rightly pointed out, every market has 
transaction costs. But he recognized that as this cost goes 
up, the less effective his model will be at revealing prefer-
ences (Tiebout 1956,422). 
The first-order prediction depends on economies of 
scale. But as school districts become larger in geographic 
size or more distant from one another, diseconomies 
of those types of scale may outweigh other economies 
of scale that might be created by consolidation. Thus a 
school district in Kimball County in western Nebraska 
may have residents with exactly the same preferences as 
a school district in Douglas County in eastern Nebraska, 
but the geographic distance between the two would un-
doubtedly overwhelm any other economies of scale that 
might be achieved through consolidation. This may also 
be the case with contiguous districts that are very large in 
geographic size. 
Finally, school consolidation entails an issue be-
yond school quality that may function differently and 
more powerfully in rural areas. In addition to providing 
schooling, schools create communities. Rural districts 
may resist consolidation not so much because they fear 
that school quality will decline, but rather because they 
fear that their sense of community will deteriorate.8 This 
tends to be an especially powerful consideration in rural 
areas. In urban areas, if District A and B combine in the 
M metropolitan area, the M community is unchanged. 
The A and B communities will change but both still have 
their identities as members of the M community and both 
expect to survive in the new AlB District, even if in a 
somewhat different form. Things are often different in 
rural areas, where the school district and metropolitan 
areas are the same and the stakes are higher: 
When death comes to a small town, the school is 
usually the last thing to go. A place can lose its 
bank, its tavern, its grocery store, its shoe shop. 
But when the school closes, you might as well put 
a fork in it. (Egan 2003)9 
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I do not mean to imply here that the community as-
pects of a school are not valued in urban areas; in fact, 
there is good evidence from Tiebout sorting that that type 
of value is attached to urban schools (see note 11). But 
the community aspects of schools are likely to be even 
more salient in rural areas where the number and variety 
of community attachments are fewer, thus increasing the 
relative value of school as community. 
All of these factors indicate that the Tiebout process 
for revealing preferences will work less well in rural ar-
eas. First, the main moving part in the model is less likely 
to move in rural areas. In suburban America a resident can 
often signal her preference for a particular school quality 
by living on one side of the street or the other. In rural 
America the distances are much greater; hence the cost of 
registering the preference is higher, so the model works 
less well. 1O Second, even when rural residents move they 
are less likely to be signaling their preference for school 
quality. In urban areas, again, the decision to live on one 
side of the street or the other may be primarily driven by 
perceived school quality; other factors, such as commut-
ing time and access to shopping, are equal on either side 
of the street. In rural areas the converse is true. The loca-
tional decision is more likely to be driven by nonschool 
factors such as the location of the family farm, land pric-
es, or the availability of work for migrant laborers. Mov-
ing to signal school quality is rare and difficult. Third, in 
rural areas, even if two adjacent districts are identical in 
their preferences for the school/tax tradeoff, the econo-
mies of scale that might be reaped by consolidation may 
be outweighed by the diseconomies of scale created by 
geographic distance. Finally, in urban areas, Tiebout sort-
ing can also function to provide a measure of the extent to 
which a district's residents value the community aspects 
of a school." But because of the other problems with the 
model in rural areas, that valuation signal is unavailable 
in the country even though the value placed on commu-
nity is likely to be considerably higher in rural areas.'2 
Since all of these factors conspire against a well-func-
tioning Tiebout model in rural areas, we simply cannot 
know much about resident preferences for school quality 
based on Tiebout sorting. This returns us to the Musgrave 
hypothesis-there is no quasi-market based way to deter-
mine rural resident preferences for school quality. Instead 
it is inherently a political process. This interferes with 
the consolidation process because it makes it more dif-
ficult to evaluate whether adjacent districts have similar 
preferences about school quality or the strength of each 
district's preference for the community-building aspects 
of their schoolsY 
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TIEBOUT IN THE COUNTRY: 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
RURAL SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION 
As the preceding discussion indicates, determining pref-
erences is a major problem in rural America. In particu-
lar, the Tiebout model, which does a decent enough job 
of revealing preferences in urban America, just does not 
work very well in the country. Given this, the principal 
goals in structuring rural consolidation efforts should be 
to encourage or require information disclosure and then 
to establish mechanisms to permit that information to be 
acted upon in a timely and reasonable way. 
In general terms, there are only two ways to struc-
ture rural school consolidation efforts. First, the state (or 
some other higher authority, such as a court) can simply 
mandate consolidation. This approach has been used in 
Nebraska and Arkansas, among other places. '4 Second, 
the state can create incentives to encourage rural school 
districts to consolidate voluntarily. This is another strat-
egy that has been used in Nebraska (Blauwkamp et al. 
2011,5-6), as well as other places (see Rural School and 
Community Trust 2006; Remsen 2010). 
MANDATED CONSOLIDATION 
The first option-mandated consolidation-is an espe-
cially problematic structure in rural America. The rea-
sons the structure is especially problematic in the country 
can be illustrated by comparing the problems there to two 
situations in which mandated consolidation might occur 
in urban America. 
One situation in which mandated consolidation might 
occur in urban America is when Tiebout sorting works 
too well-that is, when it results in sorting on criteria 
that society has deemed to be improper or questionable. 
For example, boundaries may be drawn and maintained 
in ways that maintain racial or socioeconomic separation 
(Saiger 2010; Brasington 2003a).'5 In these situations, if 
the racial or socioeconomic separation is found to be ille-
gal, courts may order consolidation even if neither of the 
districts consents. l6 
In this situation Tiebout sorting may provide a good 
window into the value people place on the particular dis-
trict boundaries and part ofthat valuation, by assumption, 
is based on preferences for racial or socioeconomic sepa-
ration. Houses on opposite sides of the boundary might 
be priced quite differently. If consolidation is ordered, 
people on the high-value side of the boundary are likely 
to suffer capital losses as well as other disappointments. 
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There are two reasons that this type of mandated con-
solidation in urban America is distinguishable from and 
less problematic than mandated consolidation in rural 
America. First, in this type of urban consolidation the 
reason consolidation is required does not have to do with 
valuation at all. Instead society has determined that cer-
tain preferences, such as those based on race, are improp-
er and should be disregarded. 17 This situation (where the 
valuations are known but disregarded for important rea-
sons) is quite different than a normal rural consolidation 
situation where the consolidation cannot be justified for 
reasons independent of school quality and tax valuations. 
In the urban consolidation situation mandated consolida-
tion is required for a good, known, and identified reason 
(such as addressing racial segregation) independent of any 
evaluation of legitimate (nonracial) resident preferences. 
Moreover, even if the legitimate resident preferences were 
to be credited in this circumstance, they would be diffi-
cult to assess with Tiebout sorting or otherwise because 
they are so conflated with the illegitimate preferences. In 
the case of rural consolidation, in contrast, there are no 
disregarded preferences and, thus, no independent justifi-
cations for mandated school consolidation. The mandated 
consolidation will be justified based on valuations of 
school quality and taxes (broadly construed) or not at all. 
Mandated urban consolidation in these circumstances 
is also less problematic than mandated rural consolida-
tion because it is easier to escape the consequences. For 
better or worse, if residents subject to the mandated urban 
consolidation do not like the new school district, other 
options are available. For example, other districts may be 
available in the metropolitan area, or there may be private 
schools, or there may be a sufficient critical mass of par-
ents to begin a charter school (Kruse 2007). None of these 
options for avoiding the effects of an unpopular decision 
are likely to be available with rural school consolidation. 
Annexation is another situation in which consolida-
tion might be required in urban America. By annexation 
I mean a situation in which there are two neighboring 
school districts, but one is much larger than the other. The 
classic case would be a growing city that has rapidly grow-
ing suburbs at its fringes. The city and a particular subur-
ban district can remain separate or consolidate to form a 
single district. But in the annexation situation, consolida-
tion requires a positive vote only from the larger district.18 
The first-order condition discussed above indicates 
that if the two districts have the same preferences for 
school quality and taxes, then both would prefer con-
solidation because of economies of scale. The available 
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social scientific evidence suggests, however, that the size 
difference alone would result in the larger district being 
more inclined to consolidate and the smaller one being 
less inclined (Brasington 2003b; Ellingsen 1998). The 
question, then, is why an annexation system would permit 
the larger school district to absorb the smaller without the 
latter's consent and, indeed, even though the latter might 
be inclined not to consent. 
Theoretically the question asks what effect the relative 
size of districts might have on the consolidation decision. 
There are at least two possible justifications for limiting 
the ability of the smaller district to block consolidation. 
First, the benefits of education may spill over positively 
into neighboring communities. Especially in an urban 
area, residents beyond the district's boundaries may enjoy 
benefits from good education through greater workforce 
productivity, a better-educated regional and statewide elec-
torate, and a stronger regional community (Wyckoff 1984; 
Brasington 2003b). Since larger districts produce more of 
this externalized public good, smaller communities may 
attempt to free ride on it and, hence, resist consolidation. 
Thus, permitting the larger district to force consolidation 
is a way of addressing this free rider problem. 
Second, the residents of the smaller district may be 
more concerned about dilution of their political power 
and status than they are about the school quality/tax 
tradeoff. In one sense this is a legitimate concern; their 
political power to influence educational policy in the fu-
ture likely will be reduced once they are absorbed into a 
larger district. But in another sense it is an illegitimate, 
or at least an indeterminate, consideration. Viewed from 
the perspective of the entire metropolitan area, crediting 
this consideration would permit the minority in the small 
district to veto the will of the majority in the broader 
district. Placing the authority to make the consolidation 
decision with the larger district limits this veto option and 
is more likely to align with normal majoritarian principles 
(Briffault 1990, 356-82). 
By reciting these justifications for annexation, I do not 
mean to imply that they are always persuasive. There cer-
tainly are countervailing factors. For example, the larger 
district may annex to exploit an adjacent small district 
with high property values and a low school-age popula-
tion. And entrusting the larger district with the annexation 
decision permits it, and not the smaller district, to define 
the contours of the community created by the school dis-
trict. But there are generally legal limits on the authority 
to annex that deal with the former problem and there is 
simply no good answer to the question of who should be 
entitled to define a community (Reynolds 1992). 
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But for our purposes the interesting part of this mes-
sage is that, again, annexation is a situation in which 
Tiebout sorting may provide us with information about 
preferences in the two districts, but we choose to ignore 
it. That is, in our prototypical situation of an urban dis-
trict absorbing an outlying suburb, it may well be that the 
smaller and larger districts have quite different preferenc-
es on school quality and taxes and that those differences 
are reflected well in property values. It may be that a house 
on the small district side of the current boundary is worth 
considerably more than a house on the large district side 
because of differences in school quality. If so, annexation 
may well result in a capital loss, and yet that is permitted, 
in part for the reasons discussed above. Thus, as with con-
solidations required for racial or socioeconomic reasons, 
annexations are situations in which valuation informa-
tion may well be known, but it is ignored (or in this case, 
overridden) by other factors. This, again, is quite different 
from the situation with rural school consolidation, where 
there are no justifications for the consolidation decision 
independent of valuation and efficiency. 
In sum, mandated consolidation seems particularly 
problematic in rural America. Mandated consolidation 
may make sense in some situations in urban America 
because the consolidations depend primarily on factors 
other than valuation, such as racial or socioeconomic eq-
uity. In contrast, in rural America, the primary concern 
driving consolidation is valuation and efficiency. As a 
result, valuation information is central. Mandated con-
solidation is especially problematic, then, because it does 
nothing to try to force preference revelation even though 
the decision is largely based on an assessment of those 
preferences; instead it requires consolidation in the ab-
sence of that information. It would be preferable to devise 
legal structures that provide a better informational base 
for making rural consolidation decisions. 
VOLUNTARY CONSOLIDATION 
The second way to structure rural school consolidation 
efforts is to create incentives to encourage rural school 
districts to consolidate voluntarily. The dividing line 
between this category and mandatory consolidation can 
be indistinct. Rural schools can sometimes be heard to 
complain that the incentives are so powerful that consoli-
dation is the only possible option (Rural School and Com-
munity Trust 2006). It can be very difficult to determine 
when the incentives become that powerful, but when they 
do, regardless of the labels placed on the scheme, they 
flip from this category into the mandatory consolidation 
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category. However, there are also examples of very soft 
incentives. For example, under a recent Vermont statute, 
the only incentive was that "school districts must discuss 
merger with ... contiguous districts, vote on whether to 
pursue a comprehensive analysis of merger, and report the 
results ... to the commissioner of education and voters" 
(Remsen 2010). Despite these difficulties, in concept this 
category is clear enough-the voluntary consolidation 
category contemplates a legal structure that encourages 
consolidation, but does not require it. 
To consider this situation, let us begin with a model 
of school consolidation that, although still bare bones, 
is slightly more complex than the one considered above. 
Assume again that there are two neighboring school dis-
tricts, each currently providing a certain level of schools 
at a particular price to their respective populations. The 
state then acts to provide a certain set of incentives to 
consolidate. As before the two districts can remain sepa-
rate or consolidate to form a single district. Since this is 
voluntary consolidation, the two districts would retain the 
authority to make this decision. We will also assume that 
we are operating in a Musgravian rather than a Tieboutian 
world-that is, all information about preferences on issues 
such as school quality and tax levels must occur through 
political voice rather than through the kinds of movements 
between school districts described by Tiebout. 
This model conceptualizes the voluntary consolida-
tion process as a repeated two-stage game. First the state 
acts to announce the consolidation incentives. This would 
normally be done by the legislature which, as described 
below, would have to choose among many possibilities. 
Once the incentives have been set by the legislature, 
school districts would decide whether to consolidate or 
not based on that set of incentives. At this second stage 
of the process, it could be that many school districts de-
cide to consolidate or that few or none do. This two-stage 
process could be repeated: in a subsequent legislative 
session, the legislature may act again to establish a new 
set of incentives, which would restart the process. In a 
Tieboutian world, this repeated two-stage process may 
work acceptably because Tiebout sorting provides a great 
deal of information to both the state and school districts 
about the preferences of residents on schools and taxes. 
The problem in a Musgravian world is that those prefer-
ences are not known and, by itself, this process does little 
to create the kinds of information that are necessary to 
make good decisions. 
Consider first the decision of the state in setting the 
consolidation incentives. Again the problem in a Mus-
gravian world is that the state has to set these incentives 
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without much information. This problem is heightened 
because the incentives can be set in a wide variety of ways. 
For example, states might establish incentives through re-
duced funding for certain categories of districts, through 
financial bonuses for districts that consolidate, by in-
creasing curricular requirements that are difficult for 
smaller districts to meet, by increasing teacher credential 
requirements, by establishing certain student transporta-
tion rules or funding schemes, by imposing limits on dis-
tance learning, by imposing certain capital requirements, 
and so on (Rural School and Community Trust 2006). At 
the first stage in this two-step process the state will set 
all of these parameters explicitly or implicitly. There are 
literally thousands of possible configurations of consoli-
dation incentives. But the state can choose only one set of 
incentives out of all those possibilities. 
The second stage, then, will be for each set of ru-
ral school districts to evaluate the one set of incentives 
proffered by the state and then to choose whether to 
consolidate. It could be that no school districts decide to 
consolidate or that many do.19 But the information provid-
ed by the second stage will be limited: given this particular 
set of consolidation incentives (out of the thousands theo-
retically available), we know that X school districts will 
agree to consolidate and that Y school districts will choose 
not to consolidate. Since this is a repeated two-stage game, 
the state will then be able to rely on this limited set of in-
formation to recalibrate its consolidation incentives for the 
second round. And the process starts again. 
Given the limits of Tiebout sorting in the country, ef-
forts to encourage voluntary school consolidation should 
be structured differently than this with the goal of encour-
aging more and better information disclosure, followed 
by a process which permits consolidation decisions to be 
made based on that improved information. 
Let us think first about the second stage of the process. 
Each school district is provided with a set of incentives 
and is then given an opportunity to decide to consoli-
date or not. Consider possible ways in which a fuller 
information base could be developed. First, following 
the Vermont statute, rather than merely being offered a 
set of incentives, school districts could be required affir-
matively to consider consolidation (Remsen 2010). This 
would mean that a more complete and representative set 
of districts would provide reactions to the incentives, even 
if the ultimate signal remains merely a yes or no to con-
solidation. Without forced consideration one would not 
know if a nonconsolidating district simply failed to think 
much about the issue or whether it had thought about it 
seriously and rejected it. Forced consideration would ad-
121 
dress that informational limitation.20 In addition, requir-
ing each district to talk to at least one other district about 
consolidation would produce more, better, and more rep-
resentative cross-district information. 
Second, school districts could be required to engage in 
a process that would provide even more information about 
the reasons for their consolidation decision. Since we are 
talking about rural school consolidation, the populations 
involved would be relatively small and the interest and 
motivation to participate would probably be quite high. 
This would mean that techniques could be employed that 
would extend beyond the district leadership (such as the 
superintendent and school board) to gather information at 
a more grassroots level. Many possibilities are available. 
Traditional general-invitation town halls are one possibil-
ity, but more modern and innovative techniques may be 
even better at discovering true preferences.21 For example, 
deliberative polling is a structured process to discover and 
shape public opinion that would likely work well in small, 
rural communities.22 Similarly, more statistically based 
"idea pageants" are a way of exploring the types of trade-
offs preferred by a population (Marinovic et al. 2011). 
There are many other possibilities and variations (Hanson 
2007; Hahn and Tetlock 2005, 2006). In the abstract, it is 
difficult to know which particular preference-revealing 
strategies might work best for rural school consolidation.23 
But the general point here is that techniques are available 
that could be used to uncover much more information 
about a district's preferences than a mere up or down vote 
on consolidation by the school board. 
The advantages of requiring targeted local school 
districts to engage in a preference-revealing process like 
this flow in several different directions. First, the process 
would help the school district population itself discover 
and explore its own preferences. A well-designed process 
would provide more information about the decision to be 
made and structure and encourage a productive discus-
sion. In the absence of a process like this, opinions are 
likely to be formed on a thinner information base and 
with fewer discussions across various community divi-
sions (such as religious or ethnic divisions). Second, and 
similarly, the school board may find that the views it has 
formed through informal contacts and the normal politi-
cal process are confirmed through a more informed and 
broader deliberative process. Or it may discover that some 
of those views should be revised. In either event, it could 
be more confident that its decision, whatever it is, is more 
data-based and closer to the popular will. Third, the ac-
cumulation ofthe information from these processes could 
be gathered to help inform the state when it considers its 
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options for the next round. As indicated above, the state's 
consolidation offer can be configured in multiple ways. 
The kinds of information gathered through these pro-
cesses can assist in the configuration for the next round. 
I will discuss this further below. Finally, there is good 
evidence that deliberative processes like these increase 
trust and confidence in governmental decision-making 
(Tomkins et al. 20lO). Thus, even if every consolidation 
decision turns out to be exactly the same with or with-
out deliberative processes like these (which would, of 
course, be impossible to know), the process itself may 
produce important benefits. These benefits may be espe-
cially important in an era when trust and confidence in 
government is at historically low levels. This may be es-
pecially important when the issue at hand is rural school 
consolidation. This is an issue that is especially likely to 
undermine mutual trust and confidence in government. 
In particular, rural school districts may be especially dis-
trustful of both the state and its initial offer and of other, 
neighboring school districts. In this context some level of 
distrust like this is inevitable. But, again, a well-designed 
deliberative process should help to minimize the distrust 
and skepticism. 
Let us turn our attention back to the first stage of the 
two-stage process: development of the consolidation offer 
from the state. Again this is a repeated two-stage game, 
so we are thinking about the first stage after at least one 
second stage has already occurred. The information from 
a preference-revealing process at the second stage can 
be used productively to inform the next first-stage offer. 
For example, the state might discover that carrots such 
as financial incentives to consolidate were viewed much 
more favorable than sticks such as state aid reductions for 
schools that did not consolidate (Dari-Mattiacci and de 
Geest 20lO). Or it might find that school districts might 
be more willing to replace cutbacks to transportation sub-
sidies to ensure shorter bus rides than they are to replace 
reductions in state support for other kinds of district ex-
penses. Or it may find the opposite on both these dimen-
sions. In any event the new information can help inform 
the next consolidation offer made by the state. 
There are at least two ways in which the first-stage 
process can be organized to facilitate better use of the 
new, richer information gathered at the second stage. 
Both involve administrative processes. First, if the sec-
ond-stage processes work, there will be a great deal of 
new data and much of it will be difficult to interpret. The 
information could be put to better use at the first stage if 
someone is assigned the task of organizing and analyzing 
it. The legislature itself, given the demands on its time and 
resources, is poorly positioned to do a good job of this it-
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self. Thus the information would be better used if the task 
of using the new information to develop a new legislative 
offer were assigned to an agency. Because rural school 
districts are likely to have some level of distrust of such 
an agency, it is important to structure the agency and its 
processes in ways that will build rather than undermine 
trust. For example, structuring the agency to be multi-
member and representative would probably be preferable 
to having a department with a single head. Similarly, 
this may be the type of situation in which nonstandard 
administrative processes, such as negotiated rulemaking 
processes, could be used to help build trust (See, e.g., the 
2012 Negotiated Rulemaking Act [5 USC §§ 561 et seq.]). 
Second, there is little reason to think that each rural 
school district will weigh each component in the legisla-
ture's consolidation offer in the same way. Some may be 
more interested in capital construction issues, others in 
transportation issues, others in teacher credentialing, and 
so on. Thus, any consolidation offer that is uniform and 
informed by the legislature's best estimate of the mar-
ginal preferences of the marginal district is destined to be 
inferior to offers that could be more finely calibrated to 
individual districts. This points to agencies again. If one 
of the goals is maximizing preferences across a number of 
diverse school districts, then one could get closer to that 
goal if an agency were provided ranges on a variety of 
the relevant parameters (such as transportation subsidies, 
capital investment rules, or teacher credential rules) and 
given the flexibility to adjust each parameter to match 
district preferences more closely. This would, of course, 
be a difficult process, but avoiding difficulty is not pos-
sible with rural school consolidation. The issue would 
be whether this type of administrative matching process 
would be more or less difficult and effective than a one-
size-fits-all consolidation offer. To ensure sufficient trust 
on the part of rural school districts to permit such a sys-
tem to work, a properly structured agency and thoughtful 
administrative processes would be crucially important. 
In sum, the basic problem with voluntary rural school 
consolidation is that we are living in a Musgravian world 
in which it is difficult to discover true preferences. There 
are no perfect solutions to this problem. But it may be 
possible to develop legal and political structures for deal-
ing with rural school consolidation that do a better job of 
preference revelation. 
CONCLUSION 
Rural school consolidation efforts are especially fraught 
in part because information about resident preferences 
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regarding school quality and taxes are so hard to discover. 
The Tiebout process that works moderately well to pro-
vide that type of information in urban America just does 
not work very well in the country. As a result, the process 
occurs in a Musgravian world in which the information 
can be uncovered only through political voice. In light of 
this, if a legislature is interested in exploring rural school 
consolidation, it would do well to consider using legal 
and political processes that would enhance the ability of 
residents to express and record their preferences. Newer 
forms of political engagement that call on modern tech-
nology are available to do this, and they may be effective 
in this context given the size and level of interest of the 
groups involved. At the least they may be worth a try 
both to permit real-world evaluation of these techniques 
and, more specifically, to see whether they would be ef-
fective in addressing the special problems of rural school 
consolidation. 
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NOTES 
I. I use the word "political" here in a technical sense. Al-
though the word has acquired a pejorative tone in recent years, 
I do not use it in that way at all. Instead, following Hirschman's 
classic formulation, I use the term to mean that rural consoli-
dation issues are more likely to be sorted out through political 
"voice" rather than through Tieboutian "exit" (Hirschman 1970). 
2. One of the leading researchers on American schools has 
said that the Tiebout process is "the most powerful force in 
American schooling" (Hoxby 2000, 1209). 
3. Because this is an essay about school consolidation, I will 
often simplify the decision set for residents as one involving 
school quality and taxes. Obviously the set is much broader and 
more complicated than that. 
4. Tiebout recognized district formation as a problem. He 
noted that unless a "sociological variable" were included in 
his model, the model could be perfectly solved if there were a 
separate municipality for each person, which would be absurd 
(or, as he put it, "trite") (Tiebout 1956,421). But, despite this, 
he did not attempt to incorporate these "sociological" variables 
into his model. 
5. Some obvious complicating factors have been stripped 
from this model to keep it simple. For example, consolida-
tion contemplates a wholesale integration of the two districts. 
Instead of that, the two districts could engage in a more fine-
tuned collaboration by contracting to share only certain func-
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tions. This would complicate the model by moving from an all 
or nothing choice set (consolidation or not) to a much broader 
choice set with many possible levels of consolidation. This is 
obviously a possibility; Nebraska's educational service units 
and the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties 
are local examples of such, more fine-tuned collaborations (See 
Rural School and Community Trust 2013; Deloitte 2005). But 
those complications are for other articles; the goal in this short 
essay is to keep the model simple and manageable. 
6. One study found that in the mid-1990s, consolidations 
in New York reduced costs per pupil by 28% for a 300-pupil 
district and by 9% for a 1,500-pupil district (Duncombe and 
Yinger 2005). See also Cogswell (2009, 66), who finds that the 
average per-pupil cost in a set of Nebraska small schools was 
18.6% higher than the state average between 2003 and 2006. But 
see Dority and Thompson (2013), who did not find consistent 
evidence that consolidation lowered per pupil monetary costs, 
in either rural or non-rural districts in Nebraska. 
7. In theory a district's preferences reflect those of the me-
dian voter (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973). 
8. If consolidation is possible, the first-order condition 
would imply that preferences about school quality are similar. 
9. This article in the New York Times used Superior, Ne-
braska, as its primary example. I do not mean to imply here that 
the community aspects of a school are not valued in urban areas; 
in fact there is good evidence from Tiebout sorting that that type 
of value is attached to urban schools. See note 11, below. But 
the community aspects of schools are likely to be more salient 
in rural areas where the number and variety of community at-
tachments are fewer, thus increasing the relative value of school 
as community. 
10. Some states and districts have implemented open en-
rollment policies that enhance the ability of residents to signal 
their preferences. These policies permit residents to choose 
any school within a district or even across districts (McClure-
Hartman 2012). But these types of open-enrollment policies are 
not very effective at signaling preferences in rural areas. First, 
many rural districts have only one elementary school and one 
high school, so intra-district open enrollment is simply unavail-
able as a mechanism to signal preferences. Second, even where 
possible (for example, through inter-district open enrollment), 
the distances involved in rural areas raise the cost of making 
the choice, so the signal about school quality is much weaker. 
II. For example, there is some evidence that home values 
in good urban school districts are "too high" relative to the 
value added by the schools. This overcapitalization could be 
explained by the extra value residents see in the types of com-
munities that form around those good schools (Bayer et al. 2007; 
Rothstein 2006). Similarly, one explanation for why residents 
without children tend to support public schools is that they value 
the benefits they receive from the communities that are formed 
by those attracted into good school districts through Tiebout 
sorting (Fischel 2009). Alternatively, it could be that residents 
without children are just really interested in maintaining the 
value of their houses. (Hilber and Mayer 2009). 
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The notion that good schools can create good communities 
can help to explain observations like these that would be fairly 
puzzling otherwise. 
12. All of the factors discussed in this paragraph depend on 
an admittedly rough distinction between rural and urban areas. 
But, of course, the distinction between the two is not sharp 
(Morrill et al. 1999). Consequently, Tiebout sorting may work 
reasonably well in some rural areas and not very well in some 
urban areas, depending on the particular circumstances. 
13. Note that it is not only difficult for state officials to evalu-
ate these types of preferences, but it is also difficult for the rural 
residents themselves to evaluate them. As a result, the neces-
sarily political process for sorting them out creates pressure 
within rural school districts as well as between those districts 
and state officials. 
14. In 2005 Nebraska required all Nebraska school dis-
tricts to offer grades from kindergarten through high school. 
In effect, this required all Class I districts (those with only 
elementary schools) and Class 6 districts (those with only high 
schools) to consolidate with neighboring districts. The law was 
later overturned by referendum, but not before many districts 
were consolidated (Blauwkamp et al. 2011, 4-5). In 2004, Ar-
kansas enacted a law which required 57 school districts with 
fewer than 350 students to merge with neighboring districts 
(Jimerson 2005). 
15. The prototypical cases involving racial separation are 
the desegregation cases deriving from Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation (347 US 483 [1954]). The prototypical cases involving 
socioeconomic separation are the school finance cases (Thro 
1990). 
16. As above, this description of the situation is simplified 
to facilitate discussion. The real world is much more nuanced. 
For example, inter-district remedies are permissible only if 
an inter-district violation is shown (Missouri v. Jenkins [515 
US 70 (1995)]). The school finance cases are, by their nature, 
inter-district; the desegregation cases, on the other hand, are 
more commonly intra-district. For an inter-district desegrega-
tion case, see United States v. Yonkers Board of Education (624 
F. Supp. 1276, aff'd, 837 F.2d 1182 [1985]). Similarly, in both 
desegregation and school finance cases, when they find viola-
tions, the courts are more likely to order a remedy other than 
full consolidation, such as the establishment of magnet schools 
or busing or transfer programs in desegregation cases, Liddell v. 
Board of Education of City of St. Louis (126 F.3d 1049 [1997]), 
or new state funding schemes in school finance cases. Despite 
this, consolidation is one of the possible remedies in these cases 
when inter-district violations are found. 
17. Disregarding preferences is not an uncontroversial topic 
in itself. But it is one beyond the scope of this essay (Sun stein 
1986; Elster 1983). 
18. This is a limited definition of annexation designed to 
permit exploration of certain issues. The definition is a very 
abstract description of some annexation systems, but these 
systems vary greatly across the country and some require the 
consent of both districts. Compare, for example, Hamilton v. 
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Country Board of Education of Johnson County (265 SW.2d 
873 [1954)) (discussing Arkansas law which required only the 
consent of the larger district) with Live Oak County Board 
of School Trustees v. Whitsett Common School District (181 
S.W.2d 846 [1944)) (discussing Texas law which required an 
election of all those to be included in the combined district) 
with Southern Pacific Co. v. Maricopa County (107 P.2d 212 
[1940)) (discussing Arizona law which required consent of both 
districts). In general, the state has plenary authority to decide 
the procedures required for annexation (Schools and School 
Districts [Corpus Juris Secundum, § 18 (2012))). 
19. It is worth noting that this process provides a bias against 
consolidating. School districts are generally permitted only a 
choice of consolidating or not consolidating. A deconsolidate 
option is generally not available. 
20. Forced consideration, without dictating a particular 
result, has been used in other areas successfully (National 
Labor Relations Act [29 USC §§ 151-69], 1935, § § 8[§158](a) 
(5), 8[§158] (b)(3) [imposing a duty to bargain on unions and 
employers)). 
21. General invitation public hearings have been used com-
monly by school boards considering rural consolidation. Ironi-
cally the social scientific evidence is that such hearings tend to 
increase polarization rather than to lead to consensus. More in-
novative techniques have been found to be better for exploring 
preferences (Glaeser and Sunstein 2009; Schkade 2007). 
22. This is a technique developed by Professor James S. 
Fishkin at Stanford University, and described on his website: 
A random, representative sample is first polled on the 
targeted issues. After this baseline poll, members of the 
sample are invited to gather at a single place for a week-
end in order to discuss the issues. Carefully balanced 
briefing materials are sent to the participants and are 
also made publicly available. The participants engage 
in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders 
based on questions they develop in small group discus-
sions with trained moderators. Parts of the weekend 
events are broadcast on television, either live or in taped 
and edited form. After the deliberations, the sample is 
again asked the original questions. The resulting chang-
es in opinion represent the conclusions the public would 
reach, if people had opportunity to become more in-
formed and more engaged by the issues. (Fishkin 20\3) 
23. Researchers are beginning to explore which preference-
revealing strategy might work best for what purposes (Pyt-
likZillig and Tomkins 2011). A great deal of expertise on these 
types of issues is locally available at the Public Policy Center at 
the University of Nebraska. 
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